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Abstract 
 
 With earthshaking and heartbreaking trends in African capital flight provided by a new 
database, this paper complements existing literature by answering some key  policy questions on 
the feasibility of and timeframe for policy harmonization in the battle against the economic 
scourge.  The goal of the paper is to study beta-convergence of capital flight across a set of 37 
African countries in the period 1980-2010 and to discuss the policy implications. Three main 
findings are established. (1) African countries with low capital flight rates are catching-up their 
counterparts with higher rates, implying the feasibility of policy harmonization towards fighting 
capital flight. (2) Petroleum-exporting and conflict-affected countries significantly play out in 
absolute and conditional convergences respectively. (3) Regardless of fundamental 
characteristics, a genuine timeframe for harmonizing policies is within a horizon of 6 to 13 years. 
In other words, full (100%) convergence within the specified horizon is an indication that 
policies and regulations can be enforced without distinction of nationality or locality.  
JEL Classification: C50; E62; F34; O19; O55 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 A key constraint to African growth and development is the shortage of financing (Boyce 
& Ndikumana, 2012a). The continent is facing substantial and growing financing gaps, hindering 
public investment and, poor social service delivery. Paradoxically, it is the source of large-scale 
capital flight1 which has escalated during the last decade. According to the recent report by 
Boyce & Ndikumana, 33 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries lost a total of 814 billion 
(constant 2010 US$) from 1970 to 2010. This far surpasses the amount of official development 
aid ($659 billion) and foreign direct investment ($306 billion) received by these countries. 
Consistent with Boyce & Ndikumana, assuming that the capital flight has earned (or could have 
earned) the modest interest rate measured by the short-term United States Treasury Bill rate, the 
corresponding accumulated stock of capital flight from the 33 countries would have stood at $ 
1.06 trillion in 2010. This far exceeds the external liabilities of the group of countries of $189 
billion (in 2010), giving the sub-region a paradoxical status of a “net creditor” to the rest of the 
world. This recent evidence has debunked the stereotyped perspective that SSA countries are 
severely indebted and heavily aid-dependent.   
 In light of the above, the present study contributes to existing literature by providing a 
feasible timeframe for policy harmonization in the battle against capital flight. The motivation 
for this scope and positioning is fourfold: current disturbing trends in African capital flight, 
missing link in the literature, availability of a new dataset and, recent methodological adaptations 
to policy harmonization. Firstly, current issues on African capital flight are earthshaking and 
heartbreaking2. Accordingly, a common denominator from concerned African scholars based on 
                         
1
 Cap ital flight according to Boyce & Ndikumana is the total capital inflows and recorded foreign exchange 
outflows.  
2 “Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo are among the richest countries in Africa with per capita 
incomes of $8,649 (second), $4,176 (5th), and $1,253 (15th), respectively. They have massive oil reserves, ranking 
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a recent bulk of ‘African flight focused’ theoretical and empirical studies, is the need for urgent 
policy action (ACAS, 2012). Hence, in response, this paper is geared towards providing 
benchmarks for policy harmonization, with particular emphasis on the feasibility of and ideal 
timeframe for the harmonization process.  Secondly, as far as we have searched, the absence of 
studies that have addressed the concern of policy harmonization represents an important missing 
link in the literature. This paper is an attempt to bridge this scholarly gap. Thirdly, the 
publication of a new database in October 2012 by Boyce & Ndikumana (2012a) provides a 
unique opportunity of assessing the phenomenon of capital flight that has not received the much 
needed scholarly attention owing to the absence of relevant data. More so, while providing for 
the possibility of more fine-tuned empirical analysis with updated policy implications, the 
richness of the dataset (in appealing time series properties) provides the much needed degrees of 
freedom essential for robust estimations. Fourthly, the study adapts to methodological insights 
from recent empirics of policy harmonization based on theoretical underpinnings of the 
convergence literature, which appear relevant in tackling some of the key questions in the battle 
against capital flight in developing countries. Hence, employment of the methodology also 
substantially contributes to the empirics of capital flight.  
 Cognizant of the above motivations, upholding blanket policies in the battle against 
capital fight may not be effective unless they are contingent on fundamental characteristics and 
prevailing trajectories of capital flight in the African continent. Hence, policy makers are most 
                                                                               
7th (Gabon), 8
th
 (Congo), and 10th (Equatorial Guinea) in the continent. While their presidents and other members 
of the political elite are amassing fortunes abroad, the majority of their fellow citizens live in abject poverty, lacking 
access to basic social services such as decent sanitation, clean drinking water, elementary school, and health care. 
Despite Equatorial Guinea’s large oil revenues, a baby born there has less chance of living to his or her fi fth 
birthday than the average sub-Saharan African infant. Gabon and Equatorial Guinea rank second and third to last 
in their rate of immunization against measles, at 55% and 51%, respectively” (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012b).  Beside 
Boyce & Ndikumana (2012b) who provide  excellent stylized facts on this scourge, the Association of Concerned 
African Scholars (ACAS, 2012) Bullet in 87 on “Africa’s Capital Losses: What Can Be Done?”, has recently 
provided a plethora of perspectives on African capital flight (http://concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/issue87/) .  
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likely to ask the following questions before benchmarking policy harmonization. Is capital flight 
converging within Africa? (2) If so, what is the degree and timing of the convergence process? 
While an answer to the first question will guide on the feasibility of harmonizing blanket policies 
within identified fundamental characteristics of capital flight, the answer to the second will 
determine an optimal timeframe for the blanket policies. Accordingly, capital flight should 
converge from two main reasons: absolute convergence would occur in countries that share the 
same fundamental characteristics of capital flight (e.g, conflicts/political instability and 
petroleum exports) and; conditional convergence may occur if countries within the same 
fundamental characteristic of capital flight differ in macroeconomic and institutional 
characteristics that determine capital flight. The intuition underlying the linkage between capital 
flight and harmonization of policies within a homogenous panel is twofold; (1) convergence in 
the capital flight rate will imply that, the adoption of common policies to combat capital flight is 
feasible and; (2) full (100%) convergence will mean, the enforcements of these policies without 
distinction of nationality and locality. Countries need to harmonize policies with convergence in 
capital flight because; countries with low rates of capital flight are catching-up their counterparts 
with higher rates. An indication that the capital flight problem is becoming worse in countries 
that formerly experienced less capital flight. This intuition is consistent with very recent 
methodological insights into intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization against software 
piracy (Asongu, 2012).  
The intuition motivating this paper is also in accordance with the evidence of income 
convergence across countries which has been investigated in the context of neoclassical growth 
models, originally developed by the pioneering works of Baumol (1986),  Barro  & Sala- i-Martin 
(1992, 1995) and Mankiw et al. (1992). The theoretical underpinnings of income convergence 
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are abundant in the empirical growth literature (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) and have recently 
been applied in other areas of economic development (Asongu, 2013b). While there is a theory 
and vast empirical work on per capita income convergence, there is yet not a theory on 
convergence in other development branches e.g financial markets, IPRs, knowledge economy 
(KE)...etc. In facts, there is a growing importance of empirical convergence application to IPRs 
harmonization (Andrés & Asongu, 2013), financial markets (Bruno et al., 2012; Narayan et al., 
2011; Asongu, 2013a,b), optimality of currency areas (Asongu, 2013c,d) and KE (Asongu, 
2013e). In light of these developments, aware of the risks of ‘doing measurement without 
theory’; we argue that, reporting facts even without the presence of a formal theoretical model is 
a useful scientific activity. Hence, we concur with recent literature (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; 
Narayan et al., 2011) in the assertion that, applied econometrics has other tasks than merely 
validating or refuting economic theories.  
As far as we have searched, the literature on African capital flight can be classified into 
four main strands: the importance of studying the phenomenon in African countries; causes of 
the scourge; pull factors and destination countries and; measurement of the phenomenon and 
policy orientation.  
The first strand is largely borrowed from Boyce & Ndikumana (2011). Accordingly, the 
problem of capital flight from African economies deserves serious attention for several reasons. 
Firstly, most African countries have remained in the grip of a severe external debt crisis. 
Consistent with Boyce & Ndikumana, in 2000, debt service amounted to 3.8% of GDP for SSA 
countries. In comparative terms, the sub-region: was among the highest in literacy and infant 
mortality rates,  spent 2.4% of GDP on health and only 55% of its citizens had access to clean 
drinking water (UNECA, 2007). Hence, to the extent that the proceeds of external borrowing are 
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not used for the benefit of the African public (but rather to finance the accumulation of private 
external assets by the ruling elites), the moral and legal legitimacy of these debt-service 
obligations remains an open debate. Secondly, capital flight constitutes a diversion of scarce 
resources away from domestic investment and productive activities. In recent decades, African 
governments have achieved significantly lower investment levels than other developing 
countries (Ndikumana, 2000). Collier et al. (2001) estimate that if Africa were able to attract 
back the flight component of private wealth, domestic private capital stock would rise by about 
two-third. They also postulate that Africa’s GDP per capita is 16% lower than it would be if the 
continent had been able to retain its private wealth at home. Fofack & Ndikumana (2009) are 
broadly consistent with this position in their documentation of large potential domestic gains 
from capital flight repatriation. Thirdly, capital flight has pronounced regressive effects on the 
distribution of wealth. Individuals who engage in this scourge (for the most part) are members of 
the subcontinent’s economic and political elite who take advantage of their privileged positions 
to acquire and channel funds abroad. Consistent with Boyce & Ndikumana (1998, 2011), both 
the acquisition and the transfer of funds often involve legally questionable practices, including 
the falsification of trade documents (trade misinvoicing), the embezzlement of export revenues 
and, kickbacks on public and private contracts. The negative effects of the resulting shortages of 
revenues and foreign exchange fall disproportionately on the less wealthy strata of society. The 
regressive effect of capital flight is further heightened when financial imbalances culminate in 
devaluation:  a situation in which the wealthy that hold external assets are significantly insulated 
from the effects while the poor enjoy no such cushion. In accordance with the above, the main 
source of capital flight in African countries is the embezzlement public funds through corruption 
by officials in government. 
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In the second strand, we are consistent with Boyce & Ndikumana (2011) in devoting 
space to highlight some causes of capital flight. Accordingly, we review the existing econometric 
evidence on the determinants of capital flight. Firstly, Boyce & Ndikumana (2003) have 
established external borrowing to be strongly correlated with capital flight. A position confirmed 
by Collier et al. (2004). The pioneering work of Boyce (1992) (which distinguishes four possible 
causal links between capital flight and external debt) provides an excellent insight: debt-driven 
capital flight, debt-fueled capital flight, flight-driven external borrowing and flight- fueled capital 
flight. Secondly, capital flight tends to persists over time: everything being equal, past capital 
flight ‘causes’ more capital flight which is an indication of hysteresis in the dynamics of capital 
or the ‘training effect’ (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003).  Thirdly, higher economic growth is 
associated with lower capital flight because of higher expected returns (Boyce & Ndikumana, 
2003). Fourthly, political risk is widely believed to play a significant role in the capital 
hemorrhage experienced by African countries (Collier et al., 2004), though there are exceptions 
to this rule as illustrated by the case of the Congo (Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998). Fifthly, 
government quality (corruption, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulation quality and 
voice & accountability) has been identified as an important factor in capital flight.  
With regard to pull factors and destination countries in the third strand, while it should be 
acknowledged that good capital flight may be invested in countries that promise good returns, 
most capital flight from Africa (which is the bad type for the most part) is deposited in Tax 
heavens where banking legislation is favorable to bank secrecy. Accordingly, the main pull 
factor from destination countries should be the possibility of opening secret bank accounts. In 
spite of the evocative images conjured by the term ‘offshore’, it would be wrong to think of tax 
havens and offshore financial centers (the cluster of banks, legal and other intermediary firms 
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that operate from these jurisdictions) as disconnected and remote from mainstream nation states 
(Christensen, 2009). Hence, while geographically, many tax havens are located on small island 
economies dispersed across the spectrum of time zones, politically and economically, the 
majority of tax havens are intimately linked to major the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) states. Therefore the term ‘offshore’ is strictly a political statement 
about the nexus between the state and part of its related territories (Palan, 1999). Hence, tax 
havens harboring a great chunk of African capital flight are located in the Caribbean and 
America3, Europe4, the Middle East & Asia5 and; the Indian and Pacific Oceans6. 
The fourth strand has a double perspective. On the one hand, there is a substantial bulk of 
literature on the measurement of capital flight (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2001, 2008, 2012a) which 
has provided updated accounts on a better calibration of the phenomenon. On the other hand, 
many scholars are consistent with the following policy orientation towards the fight against the 
phenomenon: attitudinal changes culminating in better governance through accountability and 
transparency (Ajayi, 1997); strong political will on the part of African and Western governments 
as well as effective cooperation for the repatriation of capital flight (Fofack & Ndkikumana, 
2009) and; the position that much of Africa’s accumulated debts may be deemed to be odious 
and their legitimacy challenged by governments and citizens of debtor nations (Boyce & 
Ndikumana, 2011). The scope of this paper is broadly consistent with this third strand and 
complements it by providing a feasible timeframe for policy harmonization. The rest of the paper 
is organized in the following manner. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined 
                         
3
 Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, New York, Panama, Saint Lucia, St Kitts 
& Nevis, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Turks & Caicos Islands, Uruguay and USA Virgin Islands.  
4
 Alderney, Andorra, Belg ium, Campione d’Italia, City of London, Cyprus, Frankfurt, Gibraltar, Guernsey, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Ingushetia, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madeira, Malta, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Sark, Switzerland, Trieste and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  
5
 Bahrain, Dubai, Hong Kong, Labuan, Lebanon, Macau, Singapore, Tel Aviv and Taipei.  
6
 The Cook Islands, The Maldives, The Marianas, Marshall Islands , Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu.  
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respectively in Section 2. Empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 3. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1 Data 
 
 We examine a sample of 37 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World 
Bank (WB) for the period 1980-2010. The analysis is limited to only 37 African countries 
because the data on capital flight from Boyce & Ndikumana (2012a) is available only for these 
countries. Details on the sampled countries are presented in Appendix 4. We devote space to 
discussing three relevant points in this data section: determination of fundamental characteristics, 
comparability and compatibility of the capital flight measurement and, choice of control 
variables.  
 
2.1.1 Determination of fundamental characteristics 
 
 Consistent with mainstream literature, it is unlikely to find convergence within a 
heterogeneous set of countries (Asongu, 2013a). Therefore, the determination of characteristics 
that are fundamental to capital flight is crucial. Government quality (transparency, corruption, 
regulation quality …etc) and macroeconomic fundamental characteristics have the limitation of 
varying over time. Hence, the same threshold may not be consistent over time, especially on a 
horizon of over 30 years. To categorize the countries, we borrow from Weeks (2012) who has 
based his analysis on three fundamental characteristics: exporters of petroleum, conflict-affected 
and others. While these categories may be somewhat exclusive, a consensus exists that ‘conflict’ 
and ‘an export sector dominated by petroleum’ affect macroeconomic performance (Boyce & 
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Ndikumana, 2012b). However, difficulties arise in assigning countries to these categories in an 
exclusive and non-arbitrary manner.  
 Firstly, for the petroleum-exporting group, arbitrariness arises if a country qualifies for 
only a part of the time period, either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in 
production. But this is not a major problem for the 37 countries in the dataset. Another objection 
to the classification might be that, some mineral producers (such as Botswana) have 
macroeconomic characteristics similar to petroleum exporters. We are consistent with Weeks 
(2012) in taking a “minimalist” approach, adhering strictly to the petroleum category and 
including only countries whose exports have been oil dominated for over a decade: Algeria, 
Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan. Consistent with 
Boyce & Ndikumana (2012a), the oil- rich countries account for 72 % of the total capital flight 
from the SSA sub-region ($ 591 billion). They postulate that the escalation of capital flight over 
the last decade has coincided with the steady increase in oil prices prior to the global economic 
crisis.  
 Secondly, the “conflict-affected” category presents analytical and practical difficulties. 
This is essentially because; few countries of the world are completely free from conflic t. 
Therefore distinctions must be made on the basis of degree. For the 37 countries over the years 
1980-2010, few would object to the inclusion of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. We also include Ethiopia, whose internal conflict lasted 
throughout the 1980s, formally ending with Eritrean independence and a new government in 
Addis Ababa in 1991. In the years that followed, the ebb and flow of tensions between the two 
countries resulted in armed hostilities during the period 1998-2000. Despite the absence of some 
formal characteristics of civil war, we also include Zimbabwe due to the severity of its internal 
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strife. An important categorical objection is that, at least two of the petroleum countries also 
clearly quality as conflict-affected: Angola and Sudan. Contrary to Weeks (2012), for this 
analysis, the petroleum-exporting state does not take priority over the conflict status. Therefore, 
a country may fall in many categories if it has the relevant categorical characteristics. Hence, 
Angola and Sudan are also included in the conflict-affected category. Arguments could be made 
to include at least three other countries: Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007 civil war, rekindled in 2011), 
South Africa (anti-apartheid conflict until the early 1990s) and, Uganda (civil war until about 
1985 and conflict in the north since the late 1980s). We omit Côte d’Ivoire because its conflict 
affects less than a third of the years covered by the statistics. Contrary to Weeks, with include 
South Africa and Uganda because, while the former was in principle the subject of internal strife 
until the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994, the latter is still technically at war with the Lord 
Resistance Army (LRA) because its leader Kony (who refused to sign the 2007 peace 
agreement) is still at large.  
 Lastly, the ‘others’ category includes: ‘non-conflict affected’ and ‘non-petroleum 
exporting’ countries.  
 
2.1.2 Comparability and compatibility of the capital flight measurement  
 
 The capital flight indicator has two main shortcomings: it is neither comparable with 
other variables nor compatible with the underpinnings of the convergence theory. The capital 
flight indicator in the Boyce & Ndikumana database is in constant $ 2010 million terms. 
Accordingly, the state of this measurement has two implications: on the one hand, it cannot 
easily be compared with the control variables that are in current USD ($) GDP ratios for the most 
part and, on the other hand, it is not compatible with the GDP-based endogenous variables in 
mainstream convergence literature. To tackle the two issues, we:  first convert current GDP to 
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constant 2010 terms; then we divide the corresponding value by 1 000 000 to obtain a ‘GDP 
constant of 2010 USD (in millions) and; finally we divide the capital flight data by the ‘GDP 
constant of 2010 USD (in millions). Ultimately we have a capital measurement that is 
comparable with other variables (see Appendix 1) and compatible with theoretical underpinnings 
of the convergence literature.  
 
2.1.3 Control variables  
 
 14 control variables are used in two different specifications to control for financial and 
trade globalization (foreign direct investment, private capital flows and trade openness), 
government expenditure (government spending and public investment), economic prosperity 
(GDP growth and GDP per capita growth), institutional quality (regulation quality and rule of 
law), financial development (money supply and liquid liabilities), development assistance (total 
value and that from DAC7 countries) and price stability (inflation). The choice of these variables 
is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of conditional convergence which state that, if 
countries differ in macroeconomic and institutional characteristics that determine capital flight, 
then conditional convergence can occur. Consistent with Asongu (2013f), globalization is a 
natural determinant of capital flight (human and physical). One of the most attractive mediums 
via which funds are siphoned is the channel of government or public spending (Boyce & 
Ndikumana, 2012b). Capital flight increases with poor institutional quality and high levels of 
development assistance (Weeks, 2012). From intuition, investors would naturally be motivated 
to divert capital abroad in situations of extremely high inflation. Higher economic prosperity that 
is not petroleum-oriented is associated with less capital flight because of higher expected returns 
on investment (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003).  
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 Development Assistance Committee.  
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Details about the descriptive statistics, correlation analysis (showing the basic 
correlations between key variables used in this paper) and variable definitions (with 
corresponding data sources) are presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 
respectively.  The summary statistics of the variables show that there is quite a degree of 
variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated 
relationships would emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate issues of 
overparametization and multicolinearity.   Based on the correlation coefficients, there do not 
appear to be any serious concerns in terms of the relationships to be estimated because two 
specifications are employed that incorporate only one aspect (variable) of highly correlated 
macroeconomic and institutional characteristics8. The fundamental characteristics are presented 
in Appendix 4.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
The estimation approach is based on β-convergence, consistent with the methodological 
underpinning motivating the study (Asongu, 2012). Beside this justification,  the alternative view 
of convergence (σ-convergence) which postulates that, a group of economies converges when the 
cross-section variance of the variable under consideration declines, is also inappropriate because  
the adaptation to the methodological innovation is for beta-convergence. Our estimation 
procedure typically follows the evidence of income convergence across countries which has been 
investigated in the context of pioneering works in neoclassical growth models (Baumol, 1986; 
Barro & Sala- i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992), as well as in recent development 
literature (Narayan et al., 2011).  
                         
8
 We cannot employ all the control variab les in a single specification for two main reasons: (1) concerns of 
overparametizat ion and multicolinearity on the one hand and; (2) constraints in t he degrees of freedom needed for 
the Sargan OIR test of instrument validity on the other hand.  
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Consistent with the convergence literature (Fung, 2009, 3), the two equations below are 
the standard approaches in the literature for investigating conditional convergence if  tiW ,  is 
taken as strictly exogenous.  
titititititi usqdWYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln(             (1) 
 
tititititi WYaY ,,,, )ln()ln(                               (2)
 
 
 Where a = 1+ β, tiY ,  is the measure of capital flight in country i at period t. τ refers to the order 
of non-overlapping intervals. tiW ,  is a vector of determinants of capital flight,  i ( iq ) is a 
country-specific effect,  t ( ts ) is a time-specific constant and  ti , ( tiu , ) an error term. Consistent 
with the neo-classical growth model, a statistically significant negative coefficient on   in Eq. 
(1) suggests that, countries relatively close to their steady state in ‘capital flight growth’ will 
experience a slowdown in the growth of capital flight, known as conditional convergence 
(Narayan et al., 2011, 2).  In the same vein, according to Fung (2009, 3) and recent African 
convergence literature (Asongu, 2013c), if  10  a in Eq. (2) , then  tiY ,  is dynamically stable 
around the path with a trend capital flight growth rate the same as that of  tW , and with a height 
relative to the level of tW .  The variables contained in tiW ,  and the individual effect i  are 
measures of the long-term level the capital flight is converging to. Therefore, the country-
specific effect i  emphasizes other determinants of a country’s steady state not captured by 
tiW , . 
 Conditions for convergence elucidated above are valid if and only if, tiW ,  exhibits strict 
exogeneity. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because, while institutional 
quality, economic prosperity, globalization, financial development, development assistance and 
 15 
inflation (components of tiW , ) influence capital flight, the reverse effect is also true. 
Accordingly, we are confronted here with the issue of endogeneity in which control variables 
( tiW , ) are correlated with the error term ( ti , ). More so, country- and time-specific effects could 
be correlated with other variables in the model, which is very probable with lagged dependent 
variables included in the equations. A way of dealing with the problem of the correlation 
between the individual specific-effect and the lagged dependent variables consists of eliminating 
the individual effect by first differencing. Therefore Eq. (2) becomes:
              
 
)()()())ln()(ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,,     tititttitititititi WWYYaYY       (3)  
However Eq. (3) presents another issue; estimation by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is 
still biased because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent 
variable and the disturbance term. To tackle this issue, we estimate the regression in differences 
jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation. Arellano & Bond (1991) suggested an application of the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) that exploits all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged dependent  
variables and the error term.  The procedure employs lagged levels of the regressors as 
instruments in the difference equation, and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in 
the levels equation, therefore exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged 
dependent variables and the error term. Between the Difference GMM estimator (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991) and the System GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998), 
in a bid for robustness, we shall use both in the empirical analysis. However, in event of conflict 
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of interest in the findings, those of the System GMM will be given priority; in line with Bond et 
al. (2001, 3-4)9.  
The GMM estimation approach has been extensively applied in the convergence 
literature. In contrast to Narayan et al. (2011), consistent with Asongu (2013c) we shall adopt 
Fung (2009) owing to software specificities10. In model specification, we choose the two-step 
GMM option because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity11. The assumption of no 
auto-correlation in the residuals is crucial as lagged variables are to be used as instruments for 
the endogenous variables. In addition, the estimation depends on the assumption that the lagged 
values of the dependent variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the 
regression. When the error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order 
auto-correlation of the differenced residuals should be significant whereas their second-order 
auto-correlation should not be. The validity of the instruments is examined with the Sargan over-
identifying restrictions (OIR) test.  
 According to Islam (1995, 14),  yearly time spans are too short to be appropriate for 
studying convergence, as short-run disturbances may loom substantially in such brief time spans. 
Therefore, considering the data span of 31 years, we use both two-year and three-year non-
overlapping intervals (NOI).  This implies in the analysis,  τ is set to 2 and 3 respectively. We 
also examine the incidence of short-term disturbances by setting τ to 1 under the hypothesis of 
                         
9 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the initial 
conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been shown to 
perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial condit ions are potentially consistent with 
standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical application. 
Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth research ”. 
Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4).  
10
 While Narayan et al. (2011) have used Eq. (1) in the absence of fixed effects, this paper applies Eqs. (2) and (3) 
instead; in line with Fung (2009). The Fung (2009) approach has been used in recent African IPRs (Asongu, 2012) 
and financial development literature (Asongu, 2013a, b).  
11
 In the one-step, the residuals are assumed to be homoscedastic.  
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‘no intervals’. Accordingly, we compute the implied rate of convergence by calculating a/3, a/2, 
a/1 for the three-year, two-year and ‘no intervals’ datasets respectively. For example, with a/2, 
we divide the estimated coefficient of the lagged differenced endogenous variable by 2 because 
we have used a two year interval to absorb the short-term disturbances. When the absolute value 
of the estimated autoregressive coefficient is greater than zero but less than one ( 10  a ), we 
conclude the existence of convergence (in absolute or conditional terms). The broader 
interpretation suggests, past differences have less proportionate impact on future differences, 
denoting the variation on the left hand side of Eq. (3) is diminishing overtime as the country is 
converging to a steady state (Andrés & Asongu, 2013).  
To emphasize our point, the estimated lagged value of a standard dynamic GMM 
approach is a  from which 1 is subtracted to obtain β (β= a-1). In this context the information 
criterion for beta-convergence is 0 . In the same vein, in order to limit the arithmetical 
gymnastics, a  could be reported and the ‘ 10  a ’ information criterion used to determine 
convergence. This interpretation is consistent with recent convergence literature (Prochniak & 
Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23).  
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
 
3.1 Presentation of results 
 
This section investigates three principal concerns: (1) examination of the presence of 
convergence; (2) computation of the speed of convergence and; (3) determination of the time 
needed for full (100%) convergence. The summary of overall results is presented in Table 6 
where- in, the three issues are addressed. African baseline findings for absolute (unconditional) 
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and conditional convergence are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. Robustness 
checks findings for absolute (conditional) convergence are presented in Table 3 (Tables 4-5).  
Absolute convergence is estimated with only the lagged difference of the endogenous 
variable as independent variable whereas; conditional convergence is with respect to Eqs. (2) and 
(3) in the presence of control variables. Hence, unconditional convergence is estimated in the 
absence of tiW , : vector of determinants (government expenditure, trade, FDI, GDP growth, 
regulation quality, financial depth, development assistance and inflation) of capital flight12. 
Accordingly, in order to examine the validity of the model and indeed the convergence 
hypothesis; we perform two tests, notably the Sargan-test which examines the over- identification 
restrictions and the Arellano and Bond test for autocorre lation which assesses the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation. The Sargan-test examines if the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis is the position that, the instruments as a 
group are strictly exogenous (do not suffer from endogeneity), which is required for the validity 
of the GMM estimates. The p-values of estimated coefficients are presented in brackets in the 
line following the reported values of the estimated coefficients. We notice that the Sargan-test 
statistics often appear with a p-value greater than 0.10, hence its null hypothesis is not rejected in 
all the regressions. We give priority to the second order autocorrelation: AR(2) test in first 
difference because it is more relevant than AR(1) as it detects autocorrelation in levels. For 
almost all estimated models, we are unable to reject the AR(2) null hypotheses for the absence of 
autocorrelation, especially for conditional convergence specifications. Therefore, there is robust 
evidence that most of the models are deficient of autocorrelation at the 1% significance level.  
 
                         
12
 Note that the second vector of determinants entails the second set of control variab les for the second specifications 
(public investment, trade, private capital flows, GDP per cap ita growth, ru le of law, liquid liabilities, development 
aid from DAC countries and inflation).  
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3.1.1 Baseline regressions  
 Table 1 below presents the baseline regressions of absolute convergence (AC) for the 
African continent. While Panel A shows Difference GMM estimations, Panel B reveals 
corresponding System GMM estimations. Based on the results, the presence of AC is consistent 
across various datasets and estimation methods. The rate of AC varies between 17.33% per 
annum (pa) and 64.50% pa with corresponding time to full convergence of 17.3 years (yrs) and 
1.55 yrs respectively. With the 2 Yr NOI, the rate of AC varies between 30.75% pa and 33.05% 
pa for full convergence time spans of 6.5 yrs and 6.05 yrs respectively. Accordingly, for the 2 yr 
NOI, to calculate the rates and corresponding years, with the initial value of 0.615, the rate of 
convergence is 30.75% pa ((0.615/2)*100) and the time needed to achieve full convergence is 
6.5 yrs (200%/30.75%).  Hence, 6.5 yrs is required to achieve a 100% convergence for an 
estimated lagged value of 0.615. 
 
Table 1: Absolute convergence with baseline regressions  
       
 Panel A: Difference GMM  Panel B: System  GMM  
 Full Data  2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data  2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  0.543*** 0.615*** 0.52*** 0.654*** 0.661*** 0.60*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(1) -1.015 -1.055 -1.014 -1.015 -1.057 -1.015 
 (0.310) (0.291) (0.310) (0.310) (0.290) (0.309) 
AR(2) 1.006 -1.002 -0.992 1.006 -1.002 -0.992 
 (0.314) (0.316) (0.320) (0.314) (0.316) (0.320) 
Sargan OIR 14.815 13.265 10.505 15.034 15.022 10.621 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Wald 1e+4*** 4e+4*** 5e+4*** 8374*** 4e+5*** 9e+5*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  36 35 35 36 35 35 
Observations  986 469 297 1022 504 332 
       
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over -identifying Restrictions 
test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. Yrs: Years. NOI: Non-
overlapping intervals. The significance of bold values is t wofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) 
The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in 
the Sargan OIR test. 
 
 Table 2 below presents the baseline regressions of conditional convergence (CC) for the 
African continent. While Panel A shows the first specification, Panel B reveals the second 
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specification. Both specifications entail System and Difference GMM estimations. Based on the 
results, whereas estimates corresponding to the lagged coefficient are significant in the second 
specification for the most part, this is not the case with the first specification. Accordingly, this is 
not surprising because conditional convergence is contingent on the variables we choose and 
empirical test (model). For the 2 Yr NOI the rate of convergence varies between 21.00% pa and 
16.5% pa with corresponding time required for full convergence of 9.52 yrs and 12.12 yrs 
respectively. Regulation quality in Specification 1 which is the only significant control variable 
has the expected sign, since the quality of regulation by intuition should decrease the rate of 
capital flight.  For both AC and CC results in the baseline findings, the magnitude of NOI and 
choice of modeling approach significantly affect the results.  
 
3.1.2 Robustness checks  
 
A summary of overall findings (baseline and robustness checks) from Tables 3-5 is 
presented in Table 6. This includes results for AC, CC, the Speed of Absolute Convergence 
(SAC), the Speed of Conditional Convergence (SCC) and the rate required to achieve full 
(100%) convergence in both types of convergences.  
From a general standpoint, the following conclusions could be drawn. (1) The choice of 
the GMM approach significantly affects the nature of the results. (2) Contrary to Asongu (2012), 
“full data” (without mitigation of short-run disturbances) provides significant results for the most 
part. (3) The convergence rate (years to convergence) decreases (increase) as the number of non-
overlapping intervals increase. (4) Conditional convergence results based on the second 
specification (Table 5) are substantially more significant than those based on the first 
specification (Table 4). This finding further confirms the empirical basis of the paper. Hence, 
 21 
conditional convergence is based on the variables we observe and empirically test (or model); 
which may not reflect all determinants of capital flight that facilitate the convergence process.  
 Given the heterogeneous nature of the findings, our interpretations will be based on: 
system GMM results, the second specification of conditional convergence and, the two-year NOI 
for the following reasons. Firstly, the edge of system GMM estimators over difference GMM 
estimators has already been outlined in the methodology section.  Secondly, conditional 
convergence is contingent on the variables we model or empirically test and from our findings; 
determinants of capital flight in the second specification better elucidate cross-country 
differences in institutional and macroeconomic characteristics than explain conditional 
convergence. Thirdly, the choice of the two-year NOI has four premises. (1) ‘Full data’ is not 
used in mainstream literature because it is inherent of short-run disturbances. This position 
largely draws on the empirics of Islam (1995, 14). (2) NOI with a higher numerical value (say 
three-year NOI) eliminates more short-run disturbances at the cost of weakening the model. 
Hence the preference of the two-year NOI over the three-year NOI is further justified by the 
need to exploit the time series dimensions as much as possible. (3) A corollary to the above point 
is the advantage of additional degrees of freedom necessary for conditional convergence 
modeling. (4) Heuristically, from a visual analysis, capital flight does not show evidence of 
persistent business cycle (short-term) disturbances.  
To ease readership and quick-visual comparative analysis, the results on which the 
discussion is based are in bold in Panel B of Table 6. Based on the two-year NOI, system GMM 
findings and the second specification of conditional convergence modeling, the following 
findings could be established. (1) Petroleum exporting countries significantly affect the absolute 
convergence process. While the African rate of AC and time to full AC (of 33.05% per annum 
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and 6.05 years respectively) is broadly consistent across other fundamental characteristics 
(conflict and non-petroleum), those of ‘petroleum exporting’ countries are significantly different: 
with an AC rate of 15.55% per annum and a full convergence period of 12.8 years. (2) Within 
the perspective of CC, but for the conflict-affected results, African findings are broadly 
consistent across fundamental characteristics of ‘non-conflict affected’ and ‘petroleum 
exporting’ countries. (3) Irrespective of fundamental characteristics, a feasible timeframe for the 
harmonization of policies in the fight against capital flight is within a horizon of 6 to 13 years 13.   
Most of the significant control variables have the right signs in both specifications. (1) 
Globalization in terms of trade openness, foreign direct investment and private capital flows 
increase capital flight (Asongu, 2013f). (2) Public spending is one of the most attractive 
mediums through which funds are siphoned (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012b). Capital flight 
decreases with high levels of regulation quality and development assistance (Weeks, 2012). The 
intuition that investors would be naturally motivated to divert capital abroad in economic 
situations of high inflation is confirmed by the positive sign of the inflation coefficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
13
 The conclusion broadly refers to the entire sample and is based on three informat ion criteria from the empirics: 
System GMM; 2 year-NOI and the second specifications of conditional convergence estimations. 
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Table 2: Conditional convergence with baseline regressions  
              
 Panel A: Specification 1   Panel B: S pecification 2 
 Difference GMM System  GMM  Difference GMM System  GMM 
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI  Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  -0.057 -0.185 -0.47*** -0.020 -0.215 -0.31*** Initial  0.024** -0.42*** -0.44*** 0.010* -0.33*** -0.27*** 
 (0.781) (0.113) (0.042) (0.870) (0.104) (0.002)  (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.002 -0.014 0.002 -0.060 -0.044 0.034 Constant  0.051 -0.006 -0.026 -0.010 -0.197 0.083 
 (0.904) (0.549) (0.939) (0.618) (0.695) (0.778)  (0.184) (0.842) (0.484) (0.948) (0.455) (0.608) 
Gov’t  Expenditure  0.001 -0.0009 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.004   Public Investment  -0.011 0.030 0.019 -0.007 0.024 0.021 
 (0.675) (0.757) (0.742) (0.980) (0.483) (0.504)  (0.582) (0.592) (0.634) (0.443) (0.474) (0.288) 
Trade 0.001 0.001 -0.0003 0.0002 0.000 -0.000 Trade -0.003 0.011 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.0002 
 (0.808) (0.581) (0.862) (0.495) (0.937) (0.986)  (0.397) (0.237) (0.708) (0.500) (0.283) (0.880) 
Foreign Direct Ivt.  0.018 0.008 0.014 -0.000 0.001 0.003 Priv.  Capital Flows 0.017 -0.046 0.010 0.012 -0.014 0.012 
 (0.605) (0.495) (0.367) (0.988) (0.676) (0.711)  (0.279) (0.340) (0.424) (0.354) (0.523) (0.273) 
GDP Growth  0.011 0.030 0.012 0.009 0.019 0.008 GDPpc  Growth  0.0001 0.030 -0.001 0.005 0.011 -0.003 
 (0.428) (0.159) (0.359) (0.361) (0.274) (0.480)  (0.994) (0.282) (0.964) (0.691) (0.480) (0.824) 
Regulation Quality  -0.193 -0.116 -0.235 -0.015 -0.04** -0.035 Rule of Law   -0.146 0.078 0.072 0.088 -0.196 -0.157 
 (0.801) (0.201) (0.157) (0.762) (0.043) (0.622)  (0.657) (0.813) (0.754) (0.478) (0.322) (0.239) 
Financial Depth  0.517 0.532 -0.344 0.049 0.048 -0.043 Liquid Liabilities  -1.048 -0.212 0.435 0.103 -0.425 -0.297 
 (0.633) (0.487) (0.486) (0.706) (0.621) (0.812)  (0.467) (0.857) (0.595) (0.653) (0.299) (0.304) 
Foreign Aid  0.006 0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.0003 -0.0002 Foreign Aid (DAC) 0.052 -0.070 -0.094 0.017 -0.020 -0.028 
 (0.224) (0.541) (0.824) (0.202) (0.852) (0.950)  (0.130) (0.333) (0.182) (0.194) (0.442) (0.236) 
Inflation  -0.003 -0.003 0.007 -0.002 -0.001 -0.0004 Inflation  -0.0003 0.003 0.0005 0.0004 -0.001 0.0002 
 (0.763) (0.353) (0.389) (0.449) (0.421) (0.888)  (0.783) (0.448) (0.546) (0.732) (0.104) (0.507) 
              
AR(1) -1.172 -1.395 -0.778 -1.239 -1.242 -1.078 AR(1) -1.375 -1.068 -1.064 -1.369 -1.034 -1.075 
 (0.241) (0.162) (0.436) (0.215) (0.213) (0.281)  (0.169) (0.285) (0.287) (0.170) (0.300) (0.282) 
AR(2) -0.846 -0.680 -0.914 -0.862 -0.643 -0.571 AR(2) 0.941 -1.100 -0.972 0.785 -1.135 -1.000 
 (0.397) (0.496) (0.360) (0.388) (0.519) (0.567)  (0.346) (0.271) (0.330) (0.432) (0.256) (0.317) 
Sargan OIR 11.676 14.462 11.912 10.678 13.395 16.180 Sargan OIR 21.467 22.128 17.014 21.957 24.748 21.970 
 (1.000) (1.000) (0.997) (1.000) (1.000) (0.995)  (1.000) (1.000) (0.961) (1.000) (1.000) (0.944) 
Wald 2.521 37.27*** 42.09*** 15.09* 49.72*** 56.32*** Wald 57.40*** 1e+4*** 3038*** 21.48** 3333*** 2031*** 
 (0.980) (0.000) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  22 22 22 22 22 22 Countries  28 28 28 28 28 28 
Observations  180 127 74 202 149 96 Observations  215 153 91 243 181 119 
              
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. Yrs: Years.  NOI: Non-overlapping intervals. Petroleum: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-Petroleum: Countries with no significant 
exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-Conflict: Countries without significant political instability. Gov’t: Government. Ivt: Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic 
Product. Priv: Private. GDPpc: GDP per capita. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the v alidity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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Table 3: Absolute Convergence (robustness checks plus baseline) 
                
 Panel A: Difference GMM  
 Petroleum Non-Petroleum  Conflict  Non-Conflict  Africa  
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  -0.24*** -0.34*** -0.30*** 0.545*** 0.616*** 0.52*** 0.547*** 0.617*** 0.52*** -0.021 -0.085 -0.39*** 0.543*** 0.615*** 0.52*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.851) (0.468) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(1) -1.003 -1.007 -1.017 -1.007 -1.008 -1.011 -1.000 -1.001 -1.000 -1.384 -0.758 -1.261 -1.015 -1.055 -1.014 
 (0.315) (0.313) (0.308) (0.313) (0.313) (0.311) (0.317) (0.316) (0.317) (0.166) (0.448) (0.207) (0.310) (0.291) (0.310) 
AR(2) -1.013 -0.995 -1.018 1.004 -1.009 -0.995 1.000 -0.999 -0.999 -0.195 -0.741 -1.303 1.006 -1.002 -0.992 
 (0.311) (0.319) (0.308) (0.315) (0.312) (0.319) (0.317) (0.317) (0.317) (0.845) (0.458) (0.192) (0.314) (0.316) (0.320) 
Sargan OIR 5.674 7.971 6.647 8.240 6.327 6.925 5.195 5.352 4.948 24.447 20.637 23.706 14.815 13.265 10.505 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.994) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Wald 1935*** 572.2*** 286.7*** 49570*** 105456*** 71679*** 2e+7*** 6e+7*** 4e+7*** 0.035 0.525 39.61*** 1e+4*** 4e+4*** 5e+4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.851) (0.468) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  8 8 8 28 27 27 11 11 11 25 24 24 36 35 35 
Observations  225 107 67 761 362 230 313 150 95 673 319 202 986 469 297 
                
 Panel B: System  GMM  
 Petroleum Non-Petroleum  Conflict  Non-Conflict  Africa  
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  -0.22*** -0.31*** -0.18*** 0.656*** 0.661*** 0.607*** 0.650*** 0.662*** 0.61*** -0.016 -0.077 -0.38*** 0.654*** 0.661*** 0.60*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.891) (0.484) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(1) -1.012 -1.000 -1.021 -1.007 -1.009 -1.011 -1.000 -1.001 -1.000 -1.377 -0.773 -1.172 -1.015 -1.057 -1.015 
 (0.311) (0.317) (0.307) (0.313) (0.312) (0.311) (0.317) (0.316) (0.317) (0.168) (0.439) (0.240) (0.310) (0.290) (0.309) 
AR(2) -1.000 -1.038 -1.014 1.004 -1.009 -0.995 1.000 -0.999 -0.999 -0.162 -0.727 -1.282 1.006 -1.002 -0.992 
 (0.316) (0.299) (0.310) (0.315) (0.312) (0.319) (0.317) (0.317) (0.317) (0.871) (0.467) (0.199) (0.314) (0.316) (0.320) 
Sargan OIR 7.959 6.594 6.612 8.452 7.191 7.837 5.326 6.012 5.551 24.582 21.551 23.993 15.034 15.022 10.621 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Wald 6344*** 2087*** 160.7*** 12660*** 2e+6*** 7e+5*** 4e+7*** 7e+7*** 3e+7*** 0.018 0.488 24.3*** 8374*** 4e+5*** 9e+5*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.891) (0.484) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  8 8 8 28 27 27 11 11 11 25 24 24 36 35 35 
Observations  233 115 75 789 389 257 324 161 106 698 343 226 1022 504 332 
                
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. Yrs: Years. NOI: Non-overlapping intervals. Petroleum: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-Petroleum: Countries with no significant 
exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-Conflict: Countries without significant political instability. The significance of bold values is t wofold. 1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Conditional Convergence (First specification for robustness checks plus baseline) 
                
 Panel A: Difference GMM  
 Petroleum Non-Petroleum  Conflict  Non-Conflict  Africa  
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  -0.488 -1.975 -2.29** -0.018 -0.169 -0.513** -0.928 -0.418 -1.601 -0.170 -0.070 -0.463 -0.057 -0.185 -0.47*** 
 (0.496) (0.605) (0.046) (0.895) (0.105) (0.018) (0.116) (0.697) (0.112) (0.137) (0.399) (0.181) (0.781) (0.113) (0.042) 
Constant  -3.491* -0.022 -0.018 -0.053 -0.013 -0.015 -0.233 0.011 0.003 -0.117 -0.020 0.003 -0.002 -0.014 0.002 
 (0.068) (0.584) (0.212) (0.360) (0.495) (0.669) (0.258) (0.385) (0.924) (0.536) (0.355) (0.932) (0.904) (0.549) (0.939) 
Gov’t   Expenditure  0.020 -0.0008 0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0008 0.0006 0.011 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.0009 -0.001 
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 (0.741) (0.804) (0.711) (0.473) (0.660) (0.903) (0.487) (0.860) (0.312) (0.343) (0.260) (0.368) (0.675) (0.757) (0.742) 
Trade 0.049 0.002 -0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.001 --- -0.003 -0.002 0.007 0.002 0.0003 0.001 0.001 -0.0003 
 (0.184) (0.547) (0.302) (0.315) (0.656) (0.588)  (0.721) (0.727) (0.330) (0.464) (0.835) (0.808) (0.581) (0.862) 
Foreign Direct Ivt.  --- --- --- 0.018 0.0003 0.021** --- --- 0.007 0.035 0.004 0.015 0.018 0.008 0.014 
    (0.387) (0.977) (0.031)   (0.839) (0.577) (0.750) (0.165) (0.605) (0.495) (0.367) 
GDP Growth  --- --- --- 0.020 0.041** 0.013 --- --- --- 0.001 0.028 0.009 0.011 0.030 0.012 
    (0.185) (0.023) (0.354)    (0.971) (0.258) (0.420) (0.428) (0.159) (0.359) 
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- -0.011 -0.048 -0.30* --- --- --- -0.361 -0.035 -0.157 -0.193 -0.116 -0.235 
    (0.976) (0.644) (0.090)    (0.656) (0.697) (0.147) (0.801) (0.201) (0.157) 
Financial Depth  --- --- --- 0.058 0.586 -0.157 --- --- --- 0.873 0.666 0.034 0.517 0.532 -0.344 
    (0.945) (0.393) (0.762)    (0.573) (0.337) (0.975) (0.633) (0.487) (0.486) 
Foreign Aid  --- --- --- 0.018 0.008 -0.002 --- --- --- 0.037 -0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.004 0.001 
    (0.181) (0.354) (0.822)    (0.553) (0.907) (0.461) (0.224) (0.541) (0.824) 
Inflation  --- --- --- -0.022* -0.006 0.012* --- --- --- -0.009 -0.008 0.005** -0.003 -0.003 0.007 
    (0.092) (0.205) (0.081)    (0.470) (0.254) (0.013) (0.763) (0.353) (0.389) 
                
AR(1) 1.431 0.154 0.549 -1.539 -1.365 -0.932 0.082 -0.326 -0.407 -1.188 -1.339 -1.108 -1.172 -1.395 -0.778 
 (0.152) (0.877) (0.582) (0.123) (0.172) (0.351) (0.934) (0.744) (0.683) (0.234) (0.180) (0.267) (0.241) (0.162) (0.436) 
AR(2) 1.418 -0.669 -1.344 0.190 -0.826 -0.823 -21.7*** 0.056 -1.244 -0.941 -1.129 -0.639 -0.846 -0.680 -0.914 
 (0.155) (0.503) (0.178) (0.848) (0.408) (0.410) (0.000) (0.954) (0.213) (0.346) (0.258) (0.522) (0.397) (0.496) (0.360) 
Sargan OIR 0.012 0.087 3 e-5 7.372 10.289 9.390 1.658 2.973 3e-17 6.014 10.776 6.858 11.676 14.462 11.912 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.997) 
Wald 2.489 5.323 8.224** 8.232 28.75*** 56.65*** 2.996 0.629 70.8*** 10.449 12.611 27.46*** 2.521 37.27*** 42.09*** 
 (0.477) (0.149) (0.041) (0.510) (0.000) (0.000) (0.223) (0.889) (0.000) (0.315) (0.181) (0.001) (0.980) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  5 5 5 19 19 19 6 6 5 17 17 17 22 22 22 
Observations  130 64 42 158 110 65 148 71 42 139 99 58 180 127 74 
                
 Panel B: System  GMM  
 Petroleum Non-Petroleum  Conflict  Non-Conflict  Africa  
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  0.481 0.002 0.077 0.043 -0.22** -0.36*** 0.020 -0.060 -0.936 -0.114** 0.005 -0.304 -0.020 -0.215 -0.31*** 
 (0.786) (0.996) (0.842) (0.703) (0.044) (0.000) (0.965) (0.940) (0.172) (0.035) (0.949) (0.133) (0.870) (0.104) (0.002) 
Constant  -0.031 -0.043 -0.141 -0.048 -0.193* -0.090 0.050 -0.064 0.003 0.096 0.011 -0.070 -0.060 -0.044 0.034 
 (0.902) (0.632) (0.180) (0.744) (0.097) (0.403) (0.137) (0.724) (0.967) (0.599) (0.914) (0.633) (0.618) (0.695) (0.778) 
Gov’t  Expenditure  0.003 0.0001 -0.004 0.001 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.011 -0.0009 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.0003 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.957) (0.983) (0.143) (0.500) (0.806) (0.871) (0.585) (0.735) (0.189) (0.304) (0.128) (0.940) (0.980) (0.483) (0.504) 
Trade --- 0.001 0.002* 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0008 --- 0.002 0.001 0.0008 0.0001 0.000 0.0002 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.505) (0.050) (0.810) (0.422) (0.496)  (0.585) (0.189) (0.176) (0.746) (0.930) (0.495) (0.937) (0.986) 
Foreign Direct Ivt.  --- --- 0.023* 0.006 -0.0002 0.008 --- --- 0.001 0.0001 -0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.003 
   (0.084) (0.478) (0.929) (0.450)   (0.564) (0.986) (0.755) (0.779) (0.988) (0.676) (0.711) 
GDP Growth  --- --- --- 0.008 0.033* 0.015 --- --- --- 0.007 0.017 0.012 0.009 0.019 0.008 
    (0.438) (0.055) (0.183)    (0.654) (0.401) (0.535) (0.361) (0.274) (0.480) 
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- 0.031 -0.019 -0.105 --- --- --- 0.039 0.007 0.005 -0.015 -0.04** -0.035 
    (0.530) (0.663) (0.166)    (0.426) (0.868) (0.933) (0.762) (0.043) (0.622) 
Financial Depth  --- --- --- 0.007 0.143* 0.136 --- --- --- -0.151 0.009 0.100 0.049 0.048 -0.043 
    (0.943) (0.071) (0.443)    (0.258) (0.896) (0.573) (0.706) (0.621) (0.812) 
Foreign Aid  --- --- --- 0.006** 0.0005 -0.0008 --- --- --- 0.002 0.001 0.0003 0.004 -0.0003 -0.0002 
    (0.036) (0.875) (0.856)    (0.373) (0.664) (0.942) (0.202) (0.852) (0.950) 
Inflation  --- --- --- -0.006 -0.001 0.004 --- --- --- -0.008 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.0004 
    (0.234) (0.711) (0.224)    (0.177) (0.145) (0.508) (0.449) (0.421) (0.888) 
                
AR(1) -0.848 -0.721 -1.407 -1.268 -1.285 -1.101 -1.068 -0.793 -0.111 -1.172 -1.361 -1.016 -1.239 -1.242 -1.078 
 (0.396) (0.470) (0.159) (0.204) (0.198) (0.270) (0.285) (0.427) (0.911) (0.241) (0.173) (0.309) (0.215) (0.213) (0.281) 
AR(2) 0.488 0.403 -1.150 -0.303 -0.796 -0.380 0.277 0.550 -1.144 -1.121 -1.082 -0.066 -0.862 -0.643 -0.571 
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 (0.625) (0.686) (0.249) (0.761) (0.426) (0.703) (0.781) (0.582) (0.252) (0.262) (0.278) (0.947) (0.388) (0.519) (0.567) 
Sargan OIR 2.093 3.887 3.6e-18 9.708 9.110 7.378 3.039 1.981 0.883 8.679 10.095 5.765 10.678 13.395 16.180 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.995) 
Wald 0.795 1.228 56.21*** 17.03** 25.30*** 105.2*** 27.40*** 4.381 1.962 10.766 21.01** 18.44** 15.09* 49.72*** 56.32*** 
 (0.671) (0.746) (0.000) (0.048) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.223) (0.580) (0.292) (0.012) (0.030) (0.088) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  5 5 5 19 19 19 6 6 6 17 17 17 22 22 22 
Observations  135 69 36 177 129 84 154 77 53 156 116 75 202 149 96 
                
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. Yrs: Years.  NOI: Non-overlapping intervals. Petroleum: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-Petroleum: Countries with no significant 
exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-Conflict: Countries without significant political instability.Gov’t : Government. Ivt: Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic 
Product. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The fai lure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation 
in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test . 
 
 
 
Table 5: Conditional Convergence (Second specification for robustness checks plus baseline) 
                
 Panel A: Difference GMM  
 Petroleum Non-Petroleum  Conflict  Non-Conflict  Africa  
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  -0.18*** -0.39*** -0.34*** -0.084 -0.141 -0.51*** 0.21*** 0.423*** 0.24*** 0.025** -0.44*** -0.55*** 0.024** -0.42*** -0.44*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.507) (0.330) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.181 0.002 0.020 -0.001 -0.019 -0.006 -0.091 -0.380 -0.444 -0.015 0.029 -0.010 0.051 -0.006 -0.026 
 (0.684) (0.932) (0.401) (0.935) (0.168) (0.841) (0.437) (0.539) (0.395) (0.820) (0.683) (0.845) (0.184) (0.842) (0.484) 
Public Investment  0.015 0.0003 -0.009 0.002 -0.020 0.004 0.019 -0.120 0.407 -0.026 0.043 0.067* -0.011 0.030 0.019 
 (0.886) (0.990) (0.588) (0.888) (0.306) (0.821) (0.886) (0.809) (0.484) (0.363) (0.555) (0.050) (0.582) (0.592) (0.634) 
Trade --- 0.013** -0.001 0.002 0.0006 -0.001 -0.119 -0.123 -0.336 -0.004 0.008 -0.009 -0.003 0.011 0.001 
  (0.014) (0.806) (0.400) (0.775) (0.642) (0.364) (0.351) (0.347) (0.600) (0.402) (0.235) (0.397) (0.237) (0.708) 
Priv.  Capital Flows -0.067 -0.031 0.008 0.033* 0.014 0.025* 0.122 0.132 0.523 0.037** -0.044 0.041** 0.017 -0.046 0.010 
 (0.336) (0.259) (0.508) (0.099) (0.272) (0.066) (0.476) (0.421) (0.360) (0.012) (0.471) (0.020) (0.279) (0.340) (0.424) 
GDPpc  Growth  -0.121 -0.010 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.011 -0.093 0.301 0.474 -0.017 0.030 -0.052 0.0001 0.030 -0.001 
 (0.185) (0.387) (0.511) (0.407) (0.547) (0.516) (0.317) (0.367) (0.362) (0.511) (0.506) (0.256) (0.994) (0.282) (0.964) 
Rule of Law   --- --- --- 0.087 -0.117 -0.170 --- --- --- -0.399 0.374 -0.159 -0.146 0.078 0.072 
    (0.763) (0.309) (0.243)    (0.524) (0.367) (0.781) (0.657) (0.813) (0.754) 
Liquid Liabilities  --- --- --- -0.043 0.893 -0.064 --- --- --- -0.424 -1.112 0.314 -1.048 -0.212 0.435 
    (0.968) (0.277) (0.944)    (0.789) (0.631) (0.751) (0.467) (0.857) (0.595) 
Foreign Aid (DAC) --- --- --- 0.010 0.014 -0.010 --- --- --- 0.087** -0.174 -0.221* 0.052 -0.070 -0.094 
    (0.368) (0.214) (0.540)    (0.026) (0.254) (0.081) (0.130) (0.333) (0.182) 
Inflation  --- --- --- -0.014 -0.0008 0.011** --- --- --- 0.005 0.013 0.02*** -0.0003 0.003 0.0005 
    (0.256) (0.820) (0.010)    (0.670) (0.410) (0.004) (0.783) (0.448) (0.546) 
                
AR(1) -1.092 -0.993 -1.023 -1.637 -1.439 -0.967 -1.000 -1.025 -1.007 -1.172 -1.101 -1.262 -1.375 -1.068 -1.064 
 (0.274) (0.320) (0.306) (0.101) (0.150) (0.333) (0.317) (0.304) (0.313) (0.241) (0.270) (0.206) (0.169) (0.285) (0.287) 
AR(2) -0.929 -0.993 -0.984 -0.239 -0.597 -0.773 1.000 -0.998 0.994 0.946 -1.039 -1.147 0.941 -1.100 -0.972 
 (0.352) (0.320) (0.324) (0.810) (0.550) (0.439) (0.317) (0.317) (0.319) (0.344) (0.298) (0.251) (0.346) (0.271) (0.330) 
Sargan OIR 1.533 1.034 1.010 8.339 16.051 12.884 7.523 8.072 6.838 9.778 7.803 7.861 21.467 22.128 17.014 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.995) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.961) 
Wald 76.66*** 1730*** 1729*** 24.82*** 49.90*** 104.8*** 19200*** 81421*** 11375*** 90.48*** 4453*** 1455*** 57.40*** 1e+4*** 3038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  7 7 7 23 23 23 10 10 10 19 19 19 28 28 28 
Observations  131 66 43 177 123 75 225 110 73 148 106 63 215 153 91 
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 Panel B: System  GMM  
 Petroleum Non-Petroleum  Conflict  Non-Conflict  Africa  
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
Initial  -0.19*** -0.31*** -0.22*** -0.052 -0.223 -0.45*** -0.742 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.010** -0.33*** -0.30*** 0.010* -0.33*** -0.27*** 
 (000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.662) (0.124) (0.000) (0.555) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -1.360 -0.258 -0.228 -0.094 -0.097 -0.046 -0.146 5.001 4.124 0.102 0.102 0.122 -0.010 -0.197 0.083 
 (0.320) (0.408) (0.167) (0.444) (0.308) (0.598) (0.592) (0.410) (0.383) (0.721) (0.660) (0.741) (0.948) (0.455) (0.608) 
Public Investment  0.303 0.009 -0.004 0.005 -0.005 0.004 0.018 -0.610 -0.484 -0.021 0.022 0.034 -0.007 0.024 0.021 
 (0.256) (0.444) (0.658) (0.572) (0.456) (0.454) (0.295) (0.334) (0.330) (0.135) (0.516) (0.197) (0.443) (0.474) (0.288) 
Trade --- 0.007 0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.0007 0.0003 0.038 0.041 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.0002 
  (0.295) (0.149) (0.395) (0.967) (0.477) (0.897) (0.612) (0.451) (0.405) (0.558) (0.683) (0.500) (0.283) (0.880) 
Priv.  Capital Flows -0.132 -0.020 0.019 0.026 0.003 0.010 0.004 -0.291 -0.334 0.017 -0.005 0.030* 0.012 -0.014 0.012 
 (0.255) (0.245) (0.409) (0.152) (0.705) (0.389) (0.347) (0.514) (0.408) (0.257) (0.763) (0.059) (0.354) (0.523) (0.273) 
GDPpc  Growth  --- --- --- 0.013 0.018 0.013 0.002 0.181 0.091 -0.006 0.040 -0.008 0.005 0.011 -0.003 
    (0.296) (0.289) (0.340) (0.856) (0.387) (0.571) (0.735) (0.284) (0.842) (0.691) (0.480) (0.824) 
Rule of Law   --- --- --- -0.071 -0.043 -0.086 -0.056 --- --- 0.154 -0.111 -0.307 0.088 -0.196 -0.157 
    (0.433) (0.618) (0.264) (0.441)   (0.543) (0.687) (0.421) (0.478) (0.322) (0.239) 
Liquid Liabilities  --- --- --- 0.030 0.150 -0.013 --- --- --- 0.208 -0.460 -0.513 0.103 -0.425 -0.297 
    (0.850) (0.224) (0.941)    (0.519) (0.356) (0.364) (0.653) (0.299) (0.304) 
Foreign Aid (DAC) --- --- --- 0.001 0.005 -0.009 --- --- --- 0.027 -0.027 -0.059 0.017 -0.020 -0.028 
    (0.766) (0.405) (0.381)    (0.175) (0.567) (0.368) (0.194) (0.442) (0.236) 
Inflation  --- --- --- -0.001 0.001 0.006 --- --- --- 0.0007 -0.009 0.008 0.0004 -0.001 0.0002 
    (0.764) (0.601) (0.202)    (0.891) (0.266) (0.203) (0.732) (0.104) (0.507) 
                
AR(1) -1.027 -1.037 -1.027 -1.532 -1.327 -1.124 -0.112 -1.004 -1.001 -1.196 -1.013 -1.050 -1.369 -1.034 -1.075 
 (0.304) (0.299) (0.304) (0.125) (0.184) (0.261) (0.910) (0.314) (0.316) (0.231) (0.310) (0.293) (0.170) (0.300) (0.282) 
AR(2) -0.783 -0.789 -0.935 -0.397 -0.921 -0.501 -0.713 -1.001 0.991 0.938 -1.092 -1.009 0.785 -1.135 -1.000 
 (0.433) (0.430) (0.349) (0.690) (0.356) (0.615) (0.475) (0.316) (0.321) (0.348) (0.274) (0.312) (0.432) (0.256) (0.317) 
Sargan OIR 1.197 1.784 1.850 15.019 17.049 13.919 2.933 8.641 7.576 10.231 10.380 13.078 21.957 24.748 21.970 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) (1.000) (0.944) 
Wald 1086*** 120.3*** 69.06*** 32.72*** 37.12*** 39.07*** 6.763 8715*** 65401*** 23.65*** 10261*** 833*** 21.48** 3333*** 2031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.343) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  7 7 7 23 23 23 9 10 10 19 19 19 28 28 28 
Observations  138 73 50 200 146 98 95 120 83 167 125 82 243 181 119 
                
***, **,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients.  Yrs: Years.  NOI: Non-overlapping intervals. Petroleum: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-Petroleum: Countries with no significant 
exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-Conflict: Countries without significant political instability.Priv: Private. GDPpc: GDP per capita. DAC: Development 
Assistance Committee. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) Th e failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
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Table 6: Summary of results on Absolute and Conditional Convergences (for robustness checks plus  baseline) 
                
 Panel A: Difference GMM 
 Petroleum Non-Petroleum  Conflict  Non-Conflict  Africa  
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
 Absolute Convergence with Specifications in Table 3 
Absolute C (AC) Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
% of A.C 24.32% 17.35% 10.13% 54.55% 30.80% 17.33% 54.74% 30.88% 17.40% n.a n.a 13.10% 54.30% 30.75% 17.33% 
Years to A.C  4.11Yrs 11.5Yrs 29.6Yrs 1.83Yrs 6.49Yrs 17.3Yrs 1.82Yrs 6.47Yrs 17.2Yrs n.a n.a 22.9Yrs 1.84Yrs 6.50Yrs 17.3Yrs 
                
 Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 4 
Conditional C (CC) No No No No No Yes  No No No No No No No No Yes  
% of C.C n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 17.10% n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 15.73% 
Years to C.C  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 17.5Yrs n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 19Yrs 
                
  Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 5 
Conditional C (CC) Yes  Yes  Yes  No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
% of C.C 18.70% 19.8% 11.36% n.a n.a 17.16% 21.97% 21.18% 8.30% 2.50% 22% 18.53% 2.40% 21.15% 14.76% 
Years to C.C  5.34Yrs 10.1Yrs 26.4Yrs n.a n.a 17.4Yrs 4.55Yrs 9.44Yrs 36.1Yrs 40Yrs 9.09Yrs 16.1Yrs 41.6Yrs 9.45Yrs 20.3Yrs 
                
 Panel B: System  GMM  
 Petroleum Non-Petroleum  Conflict  Non-Conflict  Africa  
 Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI Full Data 2 Yr NOI 3Yr NOI 
 Absolute Convergence with Specifications in Table 3 
Absolute C (AC) Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes No No Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
% of A.C 22.33% 15.55% 6.26% 65.64% 33.05% 20.23% 65.00% 33.11% 20.36% n.a n.a 12.83% 64.50% 33.05% 20.23% 
Years to A.C  4.47Yrs 12.8Yrs  47.9Yrs 1.52Yrs 6.05Yrs  14.8Yrs 1.53Yrs 6.04Yrs  14.7Yrs n.a n.a 23.3Yrs 1.55Yrs 6.05Yrs  14.8Yrs 
                
 Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 4 
Conditional C (CC) No No No No Yes  Yes  No No No No No No No No Yes 
% of C.C n.a n.a n.a n.a 11.25% 12.10% n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 10.50% 
Years to C.C  n.a n.a n.a n.a 17.7Yrs 24.7Yrs n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 28.5Yrs 
                
  Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 5 
Conditional C (CC) Yes  Yes Yes  No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
% of C.C 19.50% 15.65% 7.43% n.a n.a 15.0% n.a 29.75% 18.86% 1.05% 16.88% 10.26% 1% 16.50% 9.06% 
Years to C.C  5.12Yrs 12.7Yrs  40.3Yrs n.a n.a 20Yrs n.a 6.72Yrs  15.9Yrs 95.2Yrs 11.8Yrs  23.2Yrs 100Yrs 12.1Yrs  33.1Yrs 
                
AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence.  Petroleum: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-Petroleum: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with 
significant political instability. Non-Conflict: Countries without significant political instability. 
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3.2 Discussion of results 
3.2.1 Discussion and policy implications 
 
Before we dive into the discussion of results, it is important at the outset to understand 
the economic intuition motivating absolute and conditional convergence of capital flight in the 
African continent. Absolute convergence in capital flight occurs when countries share similar 
fundamental characteristics with regard to bases governing capital flight such that, only 
variations across countries in initial levels of capital flight exist. Absolute convergence therefore 
results from factors such as the significant export of petroleum and national instability owing to 
conflicts. Absolute convergence also occurs because of adjustments common to petroleum or 
conflict-affected countries. Hence, based on the intuition we expect capital flight to be higher in 
petroleum and conflict-affected countries. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
speedy convergence because of disparities in initial conditions of capital flight. These differences 
in initial conditions depend on: (1) time-dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, 
either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in productions and; (2) spontaneous 
reoccurrence of conflicts after relatively stable periods or arbitrary and unilateral violation of 
peace accords.   
 On the other hand, conditional convergence is that which is contingent on cross-country 
differences in structural and institutional characteristics that determine capital flight. Consistent 
with the economic growth literature (Barro, 1991), conditional convergence depicts the kind of 
convergence whereby, one’s own long-term steady state (equilibrium) is contingent on structural 
characteristics and fundamentals of its economy in general  and its institutions  in particular. For 
instance, non-petroleum exporting countries may differ substantially in the level of globalization, 
institutional quality, financial development, economic prosperity, price stability, foreign aid…etc  
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To this end, our model for conditional convergence is contingent on globalization (trade, FDI 
and private capital flows), institutional quality (rule of law and regulation quality), financial 
development (at overall economic and financial system levels), economic prosperity (GDP 
growth at macro and micro levels), inflation and development assistance (total NODA and 
NODA from DAC countries). Owing to constraints in degrees of freedom, some models have not 
been conditional on all the determinants of capital flight outlined above. This is not a major issue 
because some conditional specifications in mainstream literature are not beyond two 
macroeconomic control variables (Bruno et al., 2012).  
 We have observed the following from the findings. (1) Absolute convergence in 
petroleum exporting countries is significantly different from that of other panels in particular and 
Africa in general.  The corresponding lower (higher) rate (time) of (to full) convergence in 
petroleum countries could be explained by significant differences in initial conditions of capital 
flight discussed above: time-dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, either because 
of recent discovery or substantial decline in productions. (2) Confl ict-affected countries 
significantly have a higher (lower) rate (time required) of (for full) conditional converge because 
of substantially lower cross-country differences in macroeconomic and institutional 
characteristics determining capital flight. Hence, cross-country differences in factors governing 
capital flight among conflict-affected countries are not very substantial. (3) Irrespective of 
fundamental characteristics, a feasible timeframe for the harmonization of policies in the fight 
against capital flight is within a horizon of 6 to 13 years. This empirically means that countries 
with lower rates of capital flight are catching-up their counterparts with higher rates, both in 
absolute and conditional terms. Within the framework of the intuition motivating this analysis on 
benchmarking policy harmonization, two inferences could be made: on the one hand, 
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convergence implies that, adopting common policies against the scourge is feasible and; full 
(100%) convergence within the specified time horizon reflects the implementation (or 
harmonization) of the feasible policies without distinction of nationality or locality.  
  
3.2.2 Towards harmonizing policies on African capital flight  
 
 The African Union (AU) is already putting some efforts towards stemming the tide of 
capital flight (Christensen, 2009) and some sources of the AU have accused multinational 
companies of promoting capital flight from the continent. We have observed from the analysis 
that a standard-setting framework is feasible on the horizon of between 6 to 13 years. The 
following four points are relevant issues that need to be resolved to facilitate this harmonization: 
improvement of the investment climate and ease of doing business to deter capital fight based on 
prospects of higher returns; formulation of common policies that would culminate in the 
repatriation of corruption-related capital flight deposited in Western banks and the improvement 
of formal institutions that will oversee the recuperation for this stolen capital (as well as deter 
potentially corrupt officials); involvement of Western banks in particular and the international 
community in general and; challenging the legitimacy of part of African debts.  
Firstly, African governments need to make it easier to do business in their countries. In 
fact, excessive and unhelpful regulation put off local and foreign investors all over Africa. 
Hence, growth and development are held back by governments that lack interest and capacity to 
foster private sector growth (which brings jobs, improvements to currency flows and tax 
revenues). African governments should also find ways of: streamlining and improving business 
regulations; getting rid of old or contradictory laws and; improving capacity at business 
licensing, tax and other business related government departments. This is consistent with Fofack 
& Ndikumana (2009) who have established that African governments have to focus on 
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improving the regulatory framework in order to attract private assets that were acquired legally 
and only held abroad for the purpose of maximization of returns on investment and risk 
minimization. Available evidence still indicates that African countries are trailing behind other 
countries in terms of the quality of investment climate (World Bank, 2007). This is due to 
relatively higher transactions costs which make it hard to attract legitimate assets held abroad by 
Africans. Hence, within the specified horizon of 6-13 years outlined above, the strategy for 
repatriating acquired assets should be an integral part of the national agenda for promoting both 
domestic and foreign investments.  
 Secondly, another focus of policy in the period leading to full convergence will be the 
improvement of governance in African countries. Governments should work towards 
demonstrating to asset holders that, repatriated assets will not be subject to distortionary 
treatment (taxation) or risk of embezzlement by corrupt leaders. Within this perspective, 
commitment to transparency by the African leadership will be critical in convincing private asset 
holders to repatriate their wealth back to the continent. Accordingly, a critical ingredient in the 
success of these strategies is strong political will both at the level of African governments and at 
the international level to enforce transparency in banking and capital account transactions. 
Ultimately, African countries will have little chance of uncovering and repatriating stolen funds 
without the support and cooperation of their Western counterparts. In essence, repatriation of 
capital flight should figure prominently on the agenda for mobilizing domestic resources and 
boosting international support to accelerate the common initiatives.  
 Thirdly, during the defined horizon, policies under consideration should integrate the 
participation of Western governments who also have a very important role to play in facilitating 
the repatriation of capital flight. It is the responsibility of Western governments to uproot 
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practices that enable their banks to accept deposits from African corrupt officials. These 
governments also have to play a critical role in the recovery of stolen assets by utilizing their 
economic and financial intelligence services to uncover deposits of illegally acquired funds, 
especially from African leaders and their private acolytes. Hence, individual countries’ initiatives 
for capital repatriation will require a concerted effort at the international level, especially via the 
ratification and implementation of specific conventions against fraud, corruption and money 
laundering. Within this perspective, initiatives such as the UN Resolution 55/188 of illegal 
transfer of assets, the Stolen Asset Recovery initiative and, the International Center for Asset 
Recovery need to be supported and given adequate material, human and political resources to 
promote transparency in international financial institutions (Fofack & Ndikumana, 2009).  
Regulatory mechanisms should include the following: sanctions to both African smugglers and 
their bankers; disclosure of the identity of holders of large balances to the authorities of both the 
country-of-incorporation of the bank and the country-of-origin of the asset holders; including of 
transparency related to stolen assets in the corporate ratings of Western banks to deter them from 
colluding in acts of financial crime; among others.  
Fourthly, on challenging the legitimacy of part of African external debt, the following 
points could be raised: past borrowing practices failed the test of benefiting the people; the debts 
were often borrowed in the name of the people without their consent and, historical evidence can 
readily establish the test of creditor awareness (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2011). This point is 
consistent with the thesis that, the burden of proof of legitimacy of past debts must rest on the 
lenders and that enforcing the doctrine of odious debt will result in a win-win situation for 
borrowers and lenders. Prior to full convergence, as Africa searches for ways to recuperate stolen 
funds and mitigate capital flight, we believe that the strategies outlined above for addressing the 
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issues must feature prominently in debates at the national and international development 
assistance community levels; with the AU playing the leading role.  
 
3.2.3 Caveats 
 
 Three main caveats have been retained: the absence of a sound theoretical basis, draw-backs 
in the methodology and failure to distinguish various capital flight components.  
 Firstly, using econometrics to accomplish more than just tes ting theory is not without 
downsides. The intuition basis of the work implies, results should be interpreted with caution as 
the model is conditioned on the variables we choose and empirically test, which may not directly 
reflect all macroeconomic and institutional conditions on which ‘capital flight convergence’ is 
endogenous.  
 Secondly, the choice of the convergence approach justified by the empirical 
underpinnings of Asongu (2012) also has its draw-backs. Accordingly, we would have loved to 
compute the corresponding sigma-convergence coefficients but we have stopped short of doing 
so because we are unaware of how to compute the rates of and time to full convergence for the 
approach. It should be noted that, we are adapting to a methodological innovation in the 
estimation of beta-convergence. Consistent with Apergis et al. (2010), critics of β-convergence 
dispute that, if countries converge to a common equilibrium with identical internal structures, 
then the dispersion of the variable under consideration should disappear in the long-run as all 
countries converge to the same long-run path. If on the other hand, states converge to 
‘convergence clubs’ or to their own unique equilibrium, the dispersion of this measure will not 
approach zero (Miller & Upadhyay, 2002). Moreover, in the latter case of country-specific 
equilibrium, the movements of the dispersion will be contingent on the initial distribution of the 
variable under investigation with regard to their final long-run outcomes. Unfortunately, it is not 
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feasible to avoid disparities in initial conditions within fundamental character istics for reasons 
already discussed. These differences in initial conditions depend on: (1) time-dynamic evidence 
of significant petroleum exports, either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in 
productions and; (2) spontaneous reoccurrence of conflicts after relatively stable periods or 
arbitrary and unilateral violation of peace accords.  The econometric results are heterogenous as 
statistical convergence of capital flight is not found in all the regressions for two main reasons. 
(1) Conditional convergence is relative, so it is normal for the results to vary with changes in the 
conditioning information set. (2) From an empirical standpoint, it is not unexpected to see some 
differences in the System GMM in comparison to the Difference GMM estimations because the 
former is based on some insufficiencies in the latter.  
 Thirdly, we have not distinguished ‘bad capital flight’ (i.e. illegally acquired funds, 
especially from African leaders and their “private acolytes”) from “good capital flight”, i.e. 
funds legally transferred by households and firms. Hence even in the presence of full 
convergence, policies may not be adopted without distinction of nationality and locality because: 
(1) capital moving from one country to another may be of different types across source countries 
and; (2) they may move for different reasons. Moreover, an opposite thesis might be advanced 
because while convergence facilitates understanding the depth of the capital flight problem, it is 
not the only condition for the adoption of policies because national specific reasons may be 
advocated to stem the tide.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
With earthshaking and heartbreaking trends in African capital flight provided by a new 
database, this paper has complemented existing literature by adapting an existing methodology to 
answer some key  policy questions on the feasibility of and timeframe for policy harmonization 
 36 
in the battle against the economic scourge.  Three main findings have been established. (1) 
African countries with low capital flight rates are catching-up their counterparts with higher 
rates, implying the feasibility of policy harmonization towards fighting capital flight. (2) 
Petroleum-exporting and conflict-affected countries significantly play out in absolute and 
conditional convergences respectively. (3) Regardless of fundamental characteristics, a genuine 
timeframe for harmonizing policies is within a horizon of 6 to 13 years. In other words, full 
(100%) convergence within the specified horizon is an indication that policies and regulations 
can be enforced without distinction of nationality or locality. Policy making strategies prior to 
harmonization have been discussed. 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations  
       
Capital Flight 3.647 28.643 -13.637 399.14 540 
       
Expenditure  Government Expenditure  4.015 10.790 -68.238 80.449 376 
Public Expenditure  7.704 4.636 0.000 30.120 487 
       
Globalization  Trade Openness  69.503 38.157 8.199 246.89 557 
Foreign Direct Investment 2.300 4.393 -16.118 35.190 485 
Private Capital Flows  2.410 4.555 -16.118 35.295 489 
       
Institutional 
Quality  
Regulation Quality  -0.606 0.607 -2.526 0.857 293 
Rule of Law -0.697 0.648 -2.312 0.863 294 
       
Economic 
Prosperity  
GDP growth  3.539 4.624 -29.178 24.176 559 
GDP per cap ita growth   1.060 4.407 -23.539 23.104 564 
       
Foreign Aid  Total  NODA 10.223 9.915 0.054 62.344 559 
NODA from DAC countries  6.062 6.144 -0.175 53.017 559 
       
Finance and 
Inflat ion  
Money  Supply 0.305 0.202 0.001 1.224 472 
Liquid Liabilit ies  0.235 0.186 0.001 1.017 474 
Inflat ion  105.80 1226.3 -100.00 24411 520 
       
 
 
Categorization  
Petroleum  0.216 0.412 0.000 1.000 592 
Non-Petroleum  0.783 0.412 0.000 1.000 592 
Conflict  0.297 0.457 0.000 1.000 592 
Non-conflict  0.702 0.457 0.000 1.000 592 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
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    Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis  
                
Expenditure (Ex) Financial Openness Trade Institutional Quality Economic Prosperity Foreign Aid (NODA) Finance  Capital  
Gov. Ex Pub. Ivt FDI PCF Openness R.Q R.L GDPg GDPpcg Total DAC M2 LL Inflation Flight   
1.000 0.098 0.080 0.082 0.101 0.014 0.028 0.332 0.344 0.038 0.044 -0.033 -0.018 -0.356 -0.070 Gov. Ex 
 1.000 0.116 0.111 0.227 0.231 0.383 0.146 0.163 0.261 0.269 0.181 0.151 -0.108 -0.148 Pub. Ex 
  1.000 0.982 0.511 -0.153 0.097 0.128 0.176 -0.084 -0.063 0.145 0.185 0.056 -0.060 FDI 
   1.000 0.504 -0.150 0.108 0.117 0.172 -0.068 -0.040 0.167 0.208 0.054 -0.068 PCF 
    1.000 0.032 0.218 0.107 0.163 -0.110 -0.088 0.196 0.257 0.018 -0.049 Trade 
     1.000 0.791 0.146 0.170 -0.163 -0.179 0.301 0.370 -0.193 -0.049 R.Q 
      1.000 0.091 0.161 -0.109 -0.119 0.590 0.636 -0.128 -0.025 R.L 
       1.000 0.973 0.047 0.041 0.011 0.025 -0.197 0.069 GDPg 
        1.000 0.056 0.059 0.085 0.106 -0.189 0.053 GDPpcg 
         1.000 0.953 -0.260 -0.286 -0.012 -0.080 Total Aid 
          1.000 -0.218 -0.253 0.004 -0.062 DAC Aid 
           1.000 0.967 -0.084 0.004 M2 
            1.000 -0.082 0.004 LL 
             1.000 -0.009 Inflation 
              1.000 Cap. Fight 
                
Gov. Ex: Government Expenditure. Pub. Ivt: Public Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. PCF: Private Capital Flows. R.Q: Regulation Quality. RL: Rule of Law. GDPg: GDP 
growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Total: Total NODA. DAC: NODA from DAC countries. M2: Money Supply. LL: Liquid 
Liabilities.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions(Measurement) Sources 
    
Government Expenditure  Gov. Ex Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP)  World Bank (W DI) 
    
Public Investment  Pub. Ivt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (W DI) 
    
Foreign Investment  FDI Foreign  Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (W DI) 
    
Private Capital  Flows  PCF  Private Capital Flows (% of GDP) World Bank (W DI) 
    
Trade Openness  Trade  Imports plus Exports of Goods  and Services (% of GDP) World Bank (W DI) 
    
Regulation Quality  R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.  
World Bank (W DI) 
    
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law (estimate): Captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
World Bank (W DI) 
    
GDP  Growth  GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate  World Bank (W DI) 
    
GDP per cap ita Growth  GDPpcg Average annual GDP per capita growth rate  World Bank (W DI) 
    
Foreign Aid (1) Total  Aid  Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (W DI) 
    
Foreign Aid (2) DAC Aid  NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (W DI) 
    
Financial Depth M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Liquid Liabilit ies  LL Financial System Deposits (% of GDP) World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Inflat ion  Inflat ion  Consumer Price Index (Annual %) World Bank (W DI) 
    
Capital Flight  Cap. Flight  Capital Flight (constant of  2010 in % of GDP) Boyce & 
Ndikumana (2012a)  
    
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.   NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries 
Category  Panels Countries Num 
    
 
Africa  
 
 
 
 
Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Sudan, Kenya, 
Zambia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzan ia, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivo ire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Madagascar,  Central 
African Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Gabon, Angola, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé & 
Principe, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia.  
 
   37 
   
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Nigeria, Chad, Congo Republic, Cameroon, Sudan, Algeria, Gabon, Angola. 8 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland,  Kenya, Zambia, South 
Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, 
Burundi, Congo Democrat ic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Ethiop ia, 
Madagascar,  Central African Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé 
& Principe, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia.  
 
29 
   
    
 
Stability  
Conflict  Uganda, Mozambique, Burundi, Congo Democrat ic Republic, Sudan, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia, South Africa, Angola, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe.   
  11 
   
 
 
Non-Conflict  
Botswana, Lesotho, Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzan ia, 
Seychelles , Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo Republic, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Madagascar,  Central African Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Gabon, Cape Verde, 
Sao Tomé & Principe, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia.  
 
26 
   
Num: Number of cross sections  (countries). 
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